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Abstract 
 
Judicial Performance Evaluation (JPE) is generally seen as an important part of the 
merit system, which often suffers from a lack of relevant voter information. Utah’s 
JPE system has undergone significant change in recent years. Using data from the 
two most recent JPE surveys, we provide a preliminary look at the operation of this 
new system. Our results suggest that the survey component has difficulty 
distinguishing among the judges on the basis of relevant criteria. The question 
prompts intended to measure performance on different ABA categories are also 
indistinguishable. We find evidence that, on some measures, female judges do 
disproportionately worse than male judges. We suggest that the free response 
comments and the new Court Observation Program results may improve the ability 
of the commission to make meaningful distinctions among the judges on the basis of 
appropriate criteria. 
 
 
1. Introduction 
 States have long been concerned with designing judicial selection systems that 
strike the right balance between independence and accountability. In the last several 
decades, many states have adopted a merit plan selection system (Gill 2013). This system 
pairs appointment by nonpartisan commission with retention by uncontested, nonpartisan 
election. A side effect of this arrangement is that voters are significantly less engaged in 
these noncompetitive elections (Bonneau and Hall 2009). This is due, in part, to the dearth 
of candidate information in noncompetitive elections (Klein and Baum 2001). 
 In contested partisan elections, voters will minimize the cost of voting by relying 
on partisan cues (Downs 1957). In contested nonpartisan elections, voters rely upon a 
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number of cues to serve as proxy measures for political party (Dubois 1984). Indeed, 
partisan considerations are an important part of nonpartisan elections (Hall 2001; Streb 
2007). In both types of competitive elections, increased campaign spending is associated 
with higher voter participation, most likely because of the expensive campaign’s ability to 
provide voters with information (Hall and Bonneau 2008). 
 Voters in retention elections generally have even less information available to 
them. Indeed, these voters will latch onto nearly any partisan cue in an attempt to 
formulate an opinion in these races (Squire and Smith 1988). In reaction to this 
problematic lack of information, many supporters of the merit system encourage the use of 
judicial performance evaluation (JPE) systems (Brody 2000; Dubofsky 2007; White 2001). 
The hope is that properly administered JPEs can increase electoral awareness, depoliticize 
the selection process, and provide some measure of judicial accountability to the voters 
(Kourlis and Singer 2007; Paynter and Kearney 2010l White 2009). Indeed, some even 
recommend the use of JPEs in competitive judicial elections (Singer 2007, but see Gill and 
Lazos 2009). 
 Others have expressed deep concern about the use of JPEs as a part of the official 
process of judicial retention (Durham 2000; Griffin 1994; Gill and Retzl 2014). Such 
studies have noted that administering official state-sanctioned JPEs can threaten the 
impartiality of the judicial election process. Many other works have emphasized the lack 
of question uniformity and reliability in these JPEs (Aynes 1981; Bernick and Pratto 1995; 
White 2001). Similar concerns ultimately led the American Bar Association to create a set 
of guidelines for JPEs. Despite the existence of these guidelines (American Bar 
Association 2005), scholars still find numerous problems with the design and 
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implementation of modern JPEs (Elek, Rottman, and Cutler 2012; Gill 2014; Sterling 
1993).  
 There have been few careful studies of state-sponsored JPEs, and these have been 
conducted in only a couple of states (Gill and Retzl 2014; Sterling 1993). As a result, we 
have precious little information about how well these systems operate in practice. Here, 
we add to this small but growing body of knowledge. Using an original database of JPEs 
in Utah (2012-2014), we look at the validity and reliability of the questionnaires. We also 
probe for evidence of gender disparities in the survey results. Our findings suggest that the 
survey component has difficulty distinguishing among the judges on the basis of relevant 
criteria. We do find evidence of female judges being ranked lower on various categorical 
evaluations such as communication skills, administrative capacity, and professionalism. 
Finally, our analysis of the qualitative portion of Utah’s JPE provides support for the idea 
that social cognition theory explains the disparity of how male and female judges are 
evaluated.  
2. Issues in JPE Design 
 The diversity of judicial selection systems across the American states represents the 
variety of ways in which states attempt to balance the core values of judicial accountability and 
judicial independence. While all American systems provide accountability at least for judicial 
misconduct, most of them also try to hold judges accountable for the quality of their work (Gill 
2013). To do this, the relevant decision makers must have access to some information about the 
quality of judge’s work (Dubois 1980). Information relating to the quality of judicial 
performance can serve as a heuristic for voters. In addition, such information is important as 
feedback to help judges improve their performance (Aynes 1981; Chauvin 1989).  
4 
 
 Since 1985, the American Bar Association has provided a series of guidelines (American 
Bar Association 2005) for evaluating judges. It set out several performance dimensions on which 
judges should be rated. Although they do not provide verbatim recommended questions, the 
guidelines do recommend the use of behavior-based evaluation instruments to “generate more 
meaningful information about judicial behavior” (American Bar Association 2005, 13). This is 
where things seem to go wrong (Bernick and Pratto 1995; Elek, Rottman and Cutler 2012; Gill 
2014). 
 Most states with official JPE programs have realized this. As a result, there has been a 
movement to supplement the longstanding practice of polling the bar (Feeney 1987) by including 
multiple sources and types of information in the evaluation process (Mahoney 1989; Woolf and 
Yim 2011). For example, JPEs in Alaska, Arizona, and Utah now include surveys administered to 
court employees, jurors, peace officers, and fellow judges. Recently, Utah adopted a qualitative 
approach to JPEs by relying on observation analysis of judicial performance during court 
proceedings. The observations are conducted by volunteers, thus involving members of the 
public in the evaluation process. Still, the survey of local attorneys remains the centerpiece of the 
JPE systems (Brody 2000), especially as performance evaluation commissions increase the 
number of laypeople involved in conducting the evaluations (Olson and Batjer 1999).  
 Another pressing issue with JPEs is their potential to disadvantage groups who have 
traditionally been underrepresented on the bench. Much of the concern about bias in JPEs has 
centered on their propensity to result in substantially lower scores for female judges. Gender 
discrimination has traditionally been understood as products of explicit biases driven by 
conscious motive or intent (Krieger 1995). More recently, scholars have identified the influence 
of implicit biases on the perception of performance in gender-stereotyped jobs (Gill, Lazos, and 
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Waters 2011; Gill 2014). Male professionals tend not to perceive it (Coontz 1995), but social 
science research has influenced even the U.S. Supreme Court to recognize the role implicit bias 
plays in employment decisions1. 
 Implicit bias is driven by our innate drive as humans to simplify and categorize the 
people in our environment (Lee 2005). Social cognition theory explains how we are programed 
to apply cognitive schemes, derived from our shared cultural experience, to aspects of our 
interpersonal relationships. We use situational stereotypes as shortcuts to understanding the 
physical world; we also use them to organize our interactions with other people. This happens 
implicitly, meaning that it is below the level of our conscious awareness-and often against our 
conscious intentions (Cleeremans 2003). This is what gives rise to implicit bias. 
 Implicit bias is a problem in performance evaluation, especially when we are evaluating 
performance in a job that is traditionally seen as a man’s job (Heilman 1983). Judging is 
certainly one of these. As a result, women judges often find themselves in a “double blind,” 
where they must conform to societal norms about a woman’s role while also conforming to the 
profession’s norms about what it means to be a judge. 
The particular characteristics of judicial performance evaluations only exacerbate this 
problem. These evaluations are conducted anonymously, which decreases the awareness of 
respondents to the operation of their own gender stereotypes as frames to their responses 
(Hekman et al. 2010). Attorneys generally speed through these evaluations, which increases the 
brain’s reliance on cognitive shortcuts to assemble a viable response to the question prompt 
(Carnes et al. 2005). The questions are also subjective, vague, and/or abstract (Choi, Gulati, and 
Posner 2009), which compounds the problem of gender stereotyping (Rhode 2001). The long lag 
                                                          
1Price Waterhouse v. Hopkins (1989) 490 U.S. 228.  
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time between the observation and evaluation of the behavior, which in Utah’s JPEs is up to six or 
ten years, can make behavior that is inconsistent with unconscious social stereotypes to be more 
easily accessible in the brain, leading to a magnification of this information (Barlett 1932). In all, 
surveys of judicial performance may be even more likely than other performance evaluations to 
suffer from unconscious gender bias (Gill, Lazos, and Waters 2011; Gill and Retzl 2014; Gill 
2014). 
3. Utah: A Case Study 
 Utah adopted a merit-based judicial selection system on July 1, 1985. This method uses a 
system of Judicial Nominating Commissions to assemble a pool of qualified candidates. Each 
judicial district has its own nominating commission comprised of attorneys and non-attorneys 
selected by the governor. After reviewing the records and interviewing prospective candidates, 
the commissions refer a list of candidates (five for district courts and seven for appellate courts) 
to the governor. The governor selects an individual from the list to stand for confirmation by the 
Utah Senate (Administrative Office of the Courts 2010). 
 Following the appointment, the judge must stand for a retention election at the first 
general election held more than three years after appointment. If the judge is retained following 
the initial election, then the judge will stand for subsequent retention elections every six years (or 
every ten years for supreme court justices). However, prior to standing for these retention 
elections, the Utah Judicial Council (UJC) assesses the performance of judges and renders a 
finding on the qualifications of each judge. The performance evaluation reports are summarized 
and distributed publicly. The state’s largest newspaper, the Salt Lake City Tribune, periodically 
publishes the results of the JPE, thereby providing an avenue for the electorate to use the 
information in their voting calculus. 
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 The JPE program was first introduced in 1986, and the first evaluation cycle commenced 
in 1990. The purpose of the program was primarily to provide reliable information for voters. It 
was also intended to provide a channel for judicial self-improvement. Initially, the UJC was 
charged with administering the performance evaluation survey. At the time, the UJC was 
comprised of thirteen commissioners, twelve of whom were judges and one of whom was a 
member of the bar commission (Esterling and Sampson 1998). The centerpiece of these early 
evaluations was the attorney survey of judicial performance. The analysis of these surveys was 
conducted by consultants, and the UJC would meet to vote on retention recommendations in 
light, primarily, of the survey results.  
 This practice continued for almost twenty years. In 2008, the Utah legislature created the 
Judicial Performance Evaluations Commission (JPEC). The JPEC differed from its predecessor 
in that it included significant non-judge membership. The thirteen member JPEC now includes 
appointees by the Utah Supreme Court, the state legislature, and the governor. Expansion of the 
JPEC to non-judicial members has transformed it to a more professionally diverse committee. 
The JPEC now evaluates respondent surveys from attorneys, court staff, and jurors. The JPEC 
has also implemented a ground-breaking courtroom observation program that focuses heavily on 
maintaining procedural fairness and objectivity (Woolf and Yim 2011). The JPEC uses a set of 
evaluation criteria that resemble somewhat the American Bar Association (American Bar 
Association 2005) guidelines. These are presented in Appendix A. 
4. Perception of JPEs in Utah 
The JPEs in Utah pursue the dual objectives of enhancing voter decision making and 
facilitating judicial self-improvement. While voters tend to be relatively happy with the 
contribution of JPEs to their information profiles of the judges, the judges themselves are far less 
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enthusiastic about the system. In their work analyzing JPEs across four states, Esterling and 
Sampson (1998) found a generally positive assessment of JPEs by voters in Salt Lake City. 
Around fifty percent of the respondents were familiar with UJC, and another forty percent had 
obtained a copy of the evaluation report it produced. Of those who had knowledge of the report, 
seventy-three percent said their vote function was either partially or fully influenced by the 
survey. This suggests that judicial retention evaluations are serving their purpose of lowering the 
cost of information gathering for voters. 
While the administered survey found that the public had a positive impression of the 
evaluations, a survey of Utah judges yielded much different results. Judges were overwhelmingly 
skeptical of the process, despite acknowledging the benefit of marginal information that is 
created by JPEs. Only about a quarter of the judges surveyed reported that evaluations would 
increase voter turnout in retention elections, while 29% agreed that voters rely on JPEs towards 
their vote choice. Interestingly, these figures were the lowest across the four states in the 
Easterling and Sampson (1998) analysis.  
The skepticism and negativity present in the Esterling and Sampson (1988) survey may 
be associated with the procedural mechanisms and fairness of the JPE process. When asked if 
judges have access to a fair appeals process if they disagreed with the report, only a third agreed. 
A common complaint is the fact that only negative evaluations could request an interview with 
the commission. In addition, half of the judges interviewed thought the evaluation process 
undermined their judicial independence. For Esterling and Sampson (1998), the responses from 
Utah’s judges warranted additional investigation. In a follow-up interview, judges voiced their 
concern of the attorney monopoly present in JPEs at that time. 
5. Data & Methodology 
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Since 1990, Utah has administered JPE surveys every two years to a portion of its judges. 
Because each individual judge is evaluated only once every six (or ten) years, each individual 
year’s administration evaluates approximately a third of the sitting judges in the state. After 
undergoing a major overhaul in 2008, the JPEC began conducting the attorney, staff, and juror 
surveys online. For this reason, the JPEC has collected and maintained electronic data only for 
the 2012 and 2014 administrations of the evaluations. These data are available across all levels of 
the Utah judiciary, including the Utah Supreme Court.  
Utah’s judiciary is overwhelmingly white and male. A total of twenty-four judges stood 
for retention in 2012. In 2014, forty-seven judges stood for retention. In all, sixteen of these 
judges (23%) were women. Only two judges during this period were categorized by the JPEC as 
non-white. Both of these judges were of Asian descent. This comes as little surprise, given the 
findings of the most recent U.S. Census that Utah’s population in 2013 was approximately 92% 
white (U.S. Census Bureau 2014). A total of nine judges during these election cycles were 
considered part-time, and they were excluded from the JPE process. 
 
 
5.1. Data Sources 
The 2012-2014 Judicial Performance Evaluation survey results were obtained in response 
to a Utah Government Records Access and Management Act (GRAMA) request. Data on judicial 
demographics including gender, race, education, law school, and court type were obtained from 
the American Bench Database (The American Bench 2014). These data were supplemented 
through official biographies on the Utah Courts Website.2 
                                                          
2These biographies can be found here: http://www.utcourts.gov/judgesbios. Last accessed March 28, 2015. 
10 
 
In addition to this, we investigated the disciplinary records of the judges in our sample 
using publically available data from the Utah Judicial Conduct Committee. There were no 
disciplinary records for the judges in our sample during the time periods relevant to their 
evaluation by the JPEC. This does not seem to be the result of perfectly exemplary behavior on 
the part of Utah’s judges. Instead, the problem is the short time span in our sample and the short 
time that has elapsed since then. In addition, the Utah Judicial Conduct Committee only 
publishes information about complaints it deems to be substantiated, which further limits our 
ability to glean information about the number and type of complaints lodged. 
Recently, Utah has seen a few episodes of less-than-professional judicial behavior. In 
2010, Lehi County Judge Garry Sampson removed a gun from his holster while on the bench. He 
pointed it in the direction of his bailiff. Despite protestation that this brandishing of a firearm 
was done in a “joking manner,” Judge Sampson was reprimanded for his actions (Carlisle 2010). 
Also in 2010, Judge Ronald R. Hare was charged with exposing himself in a restroom at a local 
park. In 2011, the state supreme court censured the judge and he resigned shortly thereafter (Falk 
2011). A case of sexual harassment in still ongoing involving a now retired Weber County justice 
court judge, Craig Storey. Storey is accused of making unwanted advances and authoring 
sexually explicit poems to his office manager (Gurrister 2015). The woman’s claims were met 
with inaction by the Judicial Conduct Commission in 2010 (Gurrister 2015).  
Clearly, the official judicial conduct records do not tell the full story about the scandals 
and criticism that befall Utah’s judges. For this reason, we supplement this information with a 
content analysis of newspaper coverage of the judges in our sample. Media coverage about the 
judges was compiled using judge name searches of the major newspaper in the state.3 
                                                          
3These newspapers include the Salt Lake City Tribune and the Deseret.  
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5.2. Measures of Judicial Performance 
We aim to measure the impact of judicial characteristics on the results of judicial 
performance evaluations in Utah. As such, our dependent variables are operationalized as 
responses to specific groups of questions on the 2012 and 2014 JPEC surveys. In 2012, the 
survey consisted of fifty-eight questions; in 2014, these questions were pruned by almost half to 
a total of twenty-nine. The full text of these questions is provided in Appendix B. There, we also 
show how we have aggregated these questions into categories defined by the American Bar 
Association (2005) guidelines.  
Previous research has made clear that problems common to JPE survey design can 
compromise the validity, reliability, and perceived fairness of the resulting evaluations (Elek, 
Rottman, and Cutler 2012; Gill 2014). We begin by looking for some of the warning signs in the 
Utah JPEC survey data. The inter-dimensional correlation matrix in Table 1 shows a high alpha 
level among the categories and high, significant correlations among all five of the dimensions of 
judicial performance. Table 2 shows that most of the bivariate correlation within the dimensions 
are lower than the inter-dimensional correlations. The alpha scores show a similar pattern. This 
shows that, in terms of measuring distinct concepts, the questions within each ABA category are 
not any more similar to each other than they are to the questions in other categories.  
 
Table 1: Inter-Dimensional Correlation Matrix 
 
Category Legal Ability Integrity  Communication  Professionalism  Administrative  
 
Legal Ability 
 
1.000 
    
Integrity & Impartiality 0.846*** 1.000    
Communication Skills 0.880*** 0.809*** 1.000   
Professionalism  0.839*** 0.902*** 0.832*** 1.000  
Administrative  0.807*** 0.801*** 0.822*** 0.878*** 1.000 
 
12 
 
Average inter-item covariance = 0.539, α = 0.96 
 
Overall, attorneys tended to rate judges very highly on all of the measures of judicial 
performance. Table 3 summarizes the performance ratings and the individual respondent level, 
as well as after these responses have been aggregated by judge. The range of scores is from one 
(inadequate) to five (outstanding).4 The JPEC lists different minimum requirements for 2012 
and 2014. In 2012, the judges must score at least a 3.0 out of 5.0 on at least 80% of the 
individual questions. In 2014, the JPEC requires a 3.6 in each of the evaluation categories5 as 
the minimum for the presumption of retention. None of the judges fell below these standards in 
either year. Table 3 does not show this directly. However, the minimum scores in all of the 
aggregate data are above the center value on the scale (which is 3). 
 
 
Table 2: Intra-Dimensional Analysis Summary Table 
Category # Qs N Range Avg. Cov. Alpha Corr. Range 
2012 Questions      
Legal Ability 10 781-1505 0.765 0.979 0.696-0.922 
Integrity & Impartiality 6 1383-1963 0.616 0.956 0.676-0.863 
Communication Skills 2 1148-1734 0.741 0.935 0.831 
Professionalism 3 1483-1752 0.681 0.985 0.698-0.775 
Administrative Capacity 5 1062-1973 0.561 0.920 0.602-0.755 
2014 Questions      
Legal Ability 6 548-2818 0.796 0.974 0.789-0.897 
Integrity & Impartiality 4 540-3835 0.738 0.954 0.685-0.842 
Communication Skills 5 545-3856 0.511 0.941 0.553-0.914 
Professionalism 5 2780-3821 0.528 0.943 0.681-0.836 
Administrative Capacity 7 3213-5092 0.370 0.931 0.551-0.792 
 
                                                          
4The JPEC Reports, in which the retention scores are summarized, do not indicate that the anchors were for the 
scores 2-4. They give only the first and last anchor, which are inadequate and outstanding, respectively. It is not 
clear whether additional anchors appeared on the actual survey. See Gill (2014) for a discussion of the importance of 
these anchors.  
5 Here, the JPEC refers to its own categories, which we summarize in Appendix A. 
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Full intra-dimensional correlation tables available from authors by request. Some questions listed in Appendix B are asked only 
of state supreme court judges. These questions yield 500 or fewer responses, and are omitted from this summary table. 
 
The JPEC survey also includes a section that prompts respondents to select from a list of 
adjectives those that best described the judge. The list included adjectives with both positive and 
negative connotations. The adjectives are listed in Error! Reference source not found., along 
with individual level and aggregate level descriptive statistics. Taken together with the scorers 
from Table 3, this provides strong evidence of a halo effect. Respondents selected positive 
adjectives between 20 to 43 percent of the time, while they used negative adjectives just 1 to 5 
percent of the time.  
5.3. The Judge-Level Control Variables 
In order to assess the JPE’s ability to distinguish among judges on the basis of their on-the-job 
performance, we need to provide measures of judicial quality to see if they predict JPE scores. 
To do this, we include a number of observable proxy variables. Descriptive statistics for these 
variables are included in  
Table 5. We include a measure of the prestige of the judge’s law school alma mater, which we 
operationalize as an ordinal variable based upon groupings the 2014 U.S. News and World 
Report rankings. The distribution of the ranking of the judges’ alma maters is displayed in Figure 
1.6 These measures are intended to serve as proxy variables for qualities like legal ability, 
communication skills, and administrative skills (Gill, Lazos, and Waters 2011). We also include 
each judge’s years of experience on the bench at the time of the evaluation.  
 
 
                                                          
6We have coded these as follows: Top 14 = 1; 15-50 = 2; 51-100 = 3; 100-end of rankings = 4; unranked = 5, and no 
J.D. = 6. We have opted to follow the U.S. News and World Report convention and leave the most prestigious 
schools with low scores and the least prestigious schools with high scores.  
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Table 3: Responses over ABA Categories 
Variable Mean Std. Dev. Min. Max. N 
Individual Level      
Legal Ability 4.208 0.904 1 5 4354 
Comm. Skills 4.445 0.801 1 5 5887 
Admin. Capacity 4.470 0.685 1 5 5914 
Integ. & Imp. 4.460 0.820 1 5 5906 
Pro. & Temp. 4.477 0.774 1 5 5914 
Aggregate Level 2012      
Legal Ability 4.087 0.199 3.668 4.394 24 
Comm. Skills 4.330 0.170 3.909 4.559 24 
Admin. Capacity 4.338 0.185 3.923 4.618 24 
Integ. & Imp. 4.420 0.178 3.995 4.708 24 
Pro. & Temp. 4.345 0.202 3.807 4.685 24 
Aggregate Level 2014      
Legal Ability 4.266 0.248 3.468 4.712 47 
Comm. Skills 4.496 0.196 3.994 4.830 47 
Admin. Capacity 4.528 0.160 4.051 4.784 47 
Integ. & Imp. 4.458 0.254 3.746 4.808 47 
Pro. & Temp. 4.528 0.210 3.955 4.823 47 
 
We also include measures of the amount and nature of the media coverage of each of the 
judges. We derive these measures from the local newspapers. The measures are counts of the 
number of articles about the judge. Each article was subjected to a simple content analysis by 
human coders to determine the tone of the article. Several categories of content were derived. 
Critical articles are those that expressed dissatisfaction with how the judge discharged official 
duties related to judicial decision making. Our original coding scheme distinguished these from 
articles tying the judge to some sort of scandal, which would include accusations of misconduct 
or insinuations that the judge is involved in some sort of personal shenanigans. Positive articles 
are those that mention the judge in a positive light, be it for the decisions the judge made or the 
contributions the judge has made to society.  
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Figure 1: Law School Rank of Utah Judges Evaluated 2012-2014 
 
We also collected the raw number of neutral mentions of the judges in order to control for 
the possibility that name recognition is enhanced by mention of the judge’s name in print.7 
Finally, we include an indicator for whether the judge was serving as a member of the state 
supreme court bench at the time of the evaluation. This allows us to control for differences in 
media coverage volume, visibility, and other unobserved sources of variation associated with  
Table 4: Adjective Prompts 
Variable Mean Std. Dev. Min. Max. N 
Individual Level: Positive Adjectives      
knowledgeable 0.429 0.495 0 1 6881 
Intelligent 0.432 0.495 0 1 6881 
Attentive 0.402 0.490 0 1 6881 
Considerate 0.336 0.472 0 1 6881 
Calm 0.309 0.462 0 1 6881 
Confident 0.265 0.441 0 1 6881 
Patient 0.277 0.448 0 1 6881 
Consistent 0.218 0.413 0 1 6881 
                                                          
7 We have also collected data about official reprimands. On our sample, only one of the seventy-one judges had ever 
been reprimanded, and that reprimand happened years before the sample period.  
16 
 
Polite 0.352 0.478 0 1 6881 
Receptive 0.213 0.410 0 1 6881 
Individual Level: Negative Adjectives      
Impatient 0.044 0.204 0 1 6881 
Defensive 0.023 0.149 0 1 6881 
Rude 0.013 0.112 0 1 6881 
Cantankerous 0.017 0.129 0 1 6881 
Indecisive 0.025 0.155 0 1 6881 
Dismissive 0.045 0.208 0 1 6881 
Arrogant 0.046 0.210 0 1 6881 
Disrespectful 0.017 0.129 0 1 6881 
Flippant 0.016 0.125 0 1 6881 
Aggregate: Positive Adjectives      
knowledgeable 0.436 0.140 0.157 0.814 71 
Intelligent 0.433 0.132 0.184 0.770 71 
Attentive 0.410 0.107 0.143 0.617 71 
Considerate 0.343 0.129 0.093 0.611 71 
Calm 0.316 0.116 0.111 0.583 71 
Confident 0.271 0.109 0.070 0.552 71 
Patient 0.283 0.131 0.019 0.684 71 
Consistent 0.231 0.104 0.060 0.583 71 
Polite 0.361 0.137 0.102 0.722 71 
Receptive 0.220 0.083 0.056 0.472 71 
Aggregate: Negative Adjectives      
Impatient 0.046 0.052 0 0.191 71 
Defensive 0.024 0.023 0 0.082 71 
Rude 0.013 0.022 0 0.102 71 
Cantankerous 0.019 0.033 0 0.163 71 
Indecisive 0.025 0.030 0 0.149 71 
Dismissive 0.044 0.042 0 0.185 71 
Arrogant 0.048 0.068 0 0.337 71 
Disrespectful 0.019 0.028 0 0.163 71 
Flippant 0.016 0.022 0 0.09 71 
occupying the highest bench in the state. Similarly, and because of the significant changes in the 
survey between 2012 and 2014, we include an indicator variable for the year of the survey.8 
 
Table 5: Independent Variables 
Variable Mean Std. Dev. Min. Max. N 
Individual Level Data      
                                                          
8 Because the shortest possible time span between retention elections is six years, we have no judges in the sample 
who appear in more than one year’s survey.  
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female 0.209 0.407 0 1 6881 
minority 0.019 0.137 0 1 6724 
law school rank 2.129 0.759 1 6 6881 
years on bench 9.874 7.096 2 32 6881 
supreme court 0.03 0.172 0 1 6881 
Media Coverage:      
scandal 0.013 0.113 0 1 6881 
critical 0.2 0.507 0 3 6881 
positive 0.466 0.739 0 3 6881 
neutral 21.007 19.996 0 86 6881 
year 2012 n=2883 2014 n=3998 N=6881 
Aggregate Data      
female 0.225 0.421 0 1 71 
minority 0.029 0.168 0 1 70 
law school rank 2.225 0.865 1 6 71 
years on bench 9.745 7.052 2 32 71 
supreme court 0.028 0.167 0 1 71 
Media Coverage:      
scandal 0.014 0.119 0 1 71 
critical 0.197 0.521 0 2.958 71 
positive 0.479 0.753 0 3 71 
neutral 18.577 18.696 0 86 71 
year 2012 n=24 2014 n=47 N=71 
 
We are particularly interested in the role that immutable characteristics play in shaping 
how judges are evaluated. To determine the judge’s gender, we relied upon the pronouns used in 
the official judge biographies. Our indicator variable is for female judges, such that they are 
coded as ‘1’. We also coded a race variable, which was derived in part from the raw survey 
database we were provided by the JPEC. That dataset had an indicator for judges who were 
considered by the JPEC to be of a minority race or ethnic group. In all, there were only two 
judges in this category, and both were of Asian descent. We omit this variable from the analysis 
for lack of variation.  
Unfortunately, the survey designers declined to collect important demographic data about 
the survey respondents. For this reason, we are unable to make any determinantions about the 
interaction between respondent gender and judge gender in predicting outcomes. However, the 
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designers did collect a few pieces of information about the respondents. All of these measures are 
relevant only to the attorney respondents. They include the number of years in legal practice 
(grouped into six categories) and the number of trials the attorney has argued (also grouped into 
six categories). It also includes dummy variables to indicate the fields of law in which the 
respondent attorney specializes in. These fields include collections, family law, criminal law, 
civil trials, or other. We also include a dummy variable for whether the respondent was an 
attorney or a layperson. These variables are summarized in Table 6. 
 
Table 6: Respondent Characteristics 
Variable Mean Std. Dev. Min. Max. N 
Years Exp. 5.036 2.970 0 8 5508 
No. Trials 1.555 1.488 0 5 5507 
Collections 0.034 0.182 0 1 6282 
Domestic 0.182 0.386 0 1 6282 
Criminal 0.274 0.446 0 1 6282 
Civil 0.380 0.486 0 1 6282 
Other Area 0.061 0.239 0 1 6282 
Attorney 0.751 0.432 0 1 6881 
 
 
 
6. Analyses of JPE Outcomes 
We begin by trying to determine the criteria respondents use to distinguish among the 
judges. We have assembled a number of different measures that we hypothesize will be related to 
the judge evaluation by category. We construct a series of multivariate models with the scores on 
the various ABA Guidelines categories as the dependent variables. These models are summarized 
in Table 7. The models perform relatively poorly. They explain only a tiny sliver of variance in 
the dependent variables. 
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A few patterns do emerge. Figure 2 presents a summary of the coefficients for the models 
of the scores by the ABA Guidelines (American Bar Association 2005) category. The scores 
seem to depend heavily upon the characteristics of the respondent. Recall that the performance is 
evaluated on a five-point scale. Overall, lawyers rate judges more harshly than laypeople. This is 
especially true when it comes to legal ability, where lawyers rate judges nearly three-quarters of 
a point lower. Lawyers who practice in criminal law even harsher than their peers, especially in 
their rating on the integrity and impartiality scale.  
The prestige of the judge’s law school, one of the stronger proxy variables of 
performance on several of the ABA categories, is completely unrelated to evaluation scores. This 
may be due to the lack of variance in judge’s law schools. Nearly two-thirds of the judges 
evaluated held law degrees from one of the two in-state law schools. More time on the bench 
does not appear to help judicial performance scores, except when it comes to ratings of 
professionalism and temperament. The most damaging variable is the scandal variable. In all five 
models, having a scandal reported in the newspaper is associated with lower performance scores. 
That said, there was only one reported scandal in the dataset. It involved Judge Kevin Allen of 
the first district court. During a committee hearing, Judge Allen’s financial obligations were 
brought to light including several legal decisions against him. In addition, Judge Allen’s real 
estate dealings were also questioned including his recent rezoning dispute over a farmland in 
Smithfield City. Despite voicing skepticism on how Judge Allen can meet his financial 
obligations with a judges’ salary, the committee ultimately confirmed Judge Allen.  
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Figure 2: Model Summaries for ABA Category Scores 
 
 
The influence of gender on performance scores is mixed. Although the magnitude is 
relatively small, female judges are rated lower on communication skills, administrative capacity, 
and professionalism/temperament. This is in keeping with previous research (Burger 2007; Gill 
Lazos and Waters 2011; Gill and Retzl 2013). As social cognition theory would predict, the  
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     Table 7: Models of Judicial Performance on JPEC Survey by ABA Category: OLS with Huber-White Standard Errors 
 Legal Ability Communication Administration Integrity/Impartiality Professionalism 
Female Judge -0.106 (0.070) -0.114* (0.056) -0.102* (0.048) -0.120 (0.068) -0.130* (0.064) 
Law School Rank -0.019 (0.036) -0.004 (0.021) -0.024 (0.020) -0.027 (0.032) -0.023 (0.025) 
Years on Bench -0.004 (0.004) -0.005 (0.003) -0.003 (0.002) -0.011 (0.011) 0.286* (0.003) 
Supreme Court 0.145 (0.086) 0.167* (0.076) 0.146 (0.083) 0.229** (0.052)      0.286** (0.088) 
Scandal in News -0.315*** (0.061) -0.207** (0.045) -0.305*** (0.043) -0.228*** (0.051) -0.181*** (0.048) 
2014 Survey 0.128* (0.058) 0.132** (0.044) 0.144*** (0.043) -0.016 (0.052) -0.181** (0.050) 
R No. of Trials 0.021 (0.010) 0.026* (0.011) 0.017 (0.009) 0.025* (0.011) 0.020 (0.011) 
R Criminal Practice -0.110** (0.039) -0.080* (0.038) -0.061 (0.034) -0.178*** (0.043) -0.119** (0.043) 
R is Attorney -0.698*** (0.031) -0.425*** (0.035) -0.333*** (0.030) -0.337*** (0.047) -0.340*** (0.038) 
Constant  4.915*** (0.111)  4.730*** (0.066)  4.711*** (0.067)  4.916*** (0.094)  4.789*** (0.081) 
N (Judges) 4354 (71) 5887 (71) 5914 (71) 5906 (71) 5914 (71) 
Adjusted R2 0.02 0.06 0.06 0.05 0.06 
Root MSE 0.896 0.775 0.663 0.920 0.751 
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Figure 3: Use of Positive Adjectives by Judge Gender 
 
Figure 4: Use of Negative Adjectives by Judge Gender
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assignment of some of these descriptive labels varies by gender of the judge. Figure 3 and Figure 4 
show the usage rates broken down by gender. Male judges are significantly more likely to be 
described as knowledgeable and intelligent, while female judges are significantly more likely to be 
described as attentive, patient, and receptive. This fits with societally constructed stereotypes about 
men and women. Overall, respondents are far less likely to use negative adjectives to describe the 
judges. When respondents do choose negative adjectives, male judges are significantly more likely 
to be described as dismissive and arrogant. The differences in the use of negative adjectives are 
relatively small in magnitude, of course, because so few respondents chose to use these adjectives 
to describe judges. 
7. Discussion 
In all, the JPEC’s judicial performance evaluation survey results in very little distinction 
among the judges. The halo effect is pronounced on the measures intended to capture the 
performance outlines in the ABA Guidelines. The most obvious covariates of judicial behavior 
explained very little of the variation in the ratings, perhaps because there was so little variation to 
begin with. Only 8% of respondents indicated that they felt the judge should not be retained. 
Despite this fact, the gender disparity survives in some of the measures of judicial performance.  
It is also possible that more information is hidden in the other parts of the survey. For 
example, the adjective prompts yield some interesting differences between the evaluation of female 
and male judges. In future research, we hope to explore the content of the free response and 
adjective questions. In addition, Utah’s newly implemented COP program may prove to contain 
rich qualitative data about how judges are perceived by trained, neutral observers (Woolf and Yim 
2011). 
Although our results show gender bias that is not as pervasive as what other studies have 
found (Burger 2007; Gill et al. 2011; Gill 2014; Tomsich and Guy 2012), it is still cause for 
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concern. This is a particularly acute problem given the dearth of women on the bench in Utah. 
Women can face significant difficulties in gaining appointment to the bench (Githens 1996). Many 
of these difficulties are the result of gender stereotypes, both implicit and explicit (Rhode 2001). 
This problem, which also faces women in other male-stereotyped careers, happens when a female 
applicant is seen as part of cohesive group that lacks the male-stereotyped characteristics necessary 
for success in the field (Glick et al. 1988; Heilman 1983; Johnson et al. 2008). This effect is 
exacerbated with hiring committees are dominated by male decision makers (Gorman 2005). When 
women are underrepresented in institutions like the judiciary, this “compounds gender stereotypes 
and retards the pace of equalization” (Reynolds 1999, 549). In other words, more women on the 
bench can encourage JPE respondents to see judging as less of a sex-stereotyped job, thereby 
discouraging the kind of gender-based discounting of performance we see in some of the models 
displayed in Table 7.  
When it comes down to it, however, the JPEC evaluations from 2012 to 2014 
recommended retention for every single judge it evaluated. Perhaps this is because the judges are 
of uniformly high quality. Indeed, performance evaluations systems like this avoid erring on the 
side of harshness in recommendations. This is likely an attempt to preserve the independence of the 
judiciary and to encourage cooperation from the judges being evaluated. This makes a good deal of 
sense, especially in light of Esterling and Sampson’s (1998) findings. As well, if the proper role of 
the JPE is to act as a warning alarm for particularly low-performing judges, the exercise may not 
be in vain. However, this JPE survey yields precious little actionable feedback by distinguishing 
among the judges on the ABA evaluative categories.  
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Appendix A: JPEC Criteria for Evaluation 
Knowledge and Understanding of Law 
a. The issuance of legally sound decisions; 
b. Understanding of the substantive, procedural, and evidentiary law of the state; 
c. Attentiveness to the factual and legal issues before the court; 
d. The proper application of judicial precedents and other appropriate sources of authority. 
Ability to Communicate 
a. Clarity of bench rulings and other oral communications; 
b. Quality of written opinions with specific focus on clarity and logic, and the ability to 
explain clearly the facts of a case and the legal precedents at issue; 
c. Sensitivity to impact of demeanor and other nonverbal communications. 
Preparation, Attentiveness, Dignity, and Control over Proceedings 
a. Courtesy to all parties and participants; 
b. Willingness to permit every person legally interested in a proceeding to be heard, unless 
precluded by law. 
Skills as a Manager 
a. Devoting appropriate time to all pending matters; 
b. Discharging administrative responsibilities diligently; 
c. Sensitivity to impact of demeanor and other nonverbal communications. 
Punctuality 
a. The prompt disposition of pending matters; 
b. Meeting commitments on time and according to the rules of the court; 
c. Compliance with the case processing time standard established by the Council. 
Service to the Profession and the Public 
a. Attendance at and participation in judicial and continuing legal education programs; 
b. Consistent with the Code of Judicial Conduct, participation in organizations devoted to 
improving the judicial system; 
c. Consistent with the highest principles of the law, ensuring that the court is serving the 
public and the justice system to the best of its ability and in such a manner as to instill 
confidence in the court system; 
d. Service within the organizations of the judicial branch of government and in leadership 
positions within the judicial branch of government, such as presiding judge, Judicial 
Council, Boards of Judges, and standing and ad hoc committees. 
Effectiveness in Working with Judges, Commissioners, Personnel 
a. When part of a multi-judge panel, exchanging ideas and opinions with other judges during 
the decision-making process; 
b. Critiquing the work of colleagues 
c. Facilitate the administrative responsibilities of other judges and commissioners; 
d. Effectively working with court staff. 
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Appendix B: JPEC Questions and ABA Categories 
Survey Questions (2012) ABA Category 
The judge makes sound rulings. 5-1: Legal Ability 
The judge properly applies the rules of civil procedure. 5-1: Legal Ability 
The judge properly applies the rules of criminal procedure. 5-1: Legal Ability 
The judge’s sentencing fits the offenses. 5-1: Legal Ability 
The judge makes appropriate findings of facts. 5-1: Legal Ability 
The judge appropriately applies the laws to the facts. 5-1: Legal Ability 
The judge follows legal precedent. 5-1: Legal Ability 
The judge only considers evidence in the record. 5-1: Legal Ability 
The judge’s written decisions are clear and logical. 5-3: Communication 
The judge’s written opinions offer meaningful legal analysis. 5-1: Legal Ability 
The judge was fair and impartial. 5-2: Integrity 
The judge avoids impropriety and the appearance of impropriety. 5-2: Integrity 
The judge avoids improper ex parte communications. 5-2: Integrity 
The judge’s behavior demonstrated equal treatment of all persons or 
classes of persons. 
5-2: Integrity 
The judge appears to consider both sides of an argument before 
rendering a decision. 
5-2: Integrity 
The judge holds attorneys accountable for inappropriate conduct. 5-5: Administrative 
The judge’s oral communication while in court is clear and logical. 5-3: Communication 
The judge promotes public trust and confidence in the courts through his 
or her conduct on the bench. 
5-4: Professionalism 
The judge respects the time of the participants and understands the 
personal and financial costs they may be incurring. 
5-4: Professionalism 
The judge is prepared for argument and hearings. 5-5: Administrative 
The judge treats all attorneys with equal courtesy and respect. 5-2: Integrity 
The judge rules in a timely manner. 5-5: Administrative 
The judge realistically manages his or her calendar. 5-5: Administrative 
The judge convened court without undue delay. 5-5: Administrative 
The judge provides the parties due process; namely, advance notice of 
issues to be heard an adequate opportunity to prepare and a meaningful 
opportunity to be heard. 
5-4: Professionalism 
The judge acts to ensure that linguistic/cultural differences or disabilities 
do not unfairly limit access to the justice system. 
5-5: Administrative 
The judge is willing to make difficult or unpopular decisions. 5-2: Integrity 
The judge did not allow his or her personal beliefs to inappropriately 
influence the proceedings. 
5-2: Integrity 
The judge explains the reasons for his or her decisions, when 
appropriate. 
5-3: Communications 
The judge works with pro se litigants fairly and effectively. 5-4: Professionalism 
The judge’s personal life does not impair his or her judicial performance. 5-2: Integrity 
The judge maintains diligent work habits. 5-5: Administrative 
The judge’s interactions with court staff are professional and 
constructive. 
5-5: Administrative 
The judge is an effective manager of his or her staff, operations, and 
business. 
5-5: Administrative 
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Survey Questions (2012) ABA Category 
The judge appropriately enforces deadlines and court orders 5-5: Administrative 
The judge is appropriately accessible to court personnel. 5-5: Administrative 
The judge made sure that everyone’s behavior in the courtroom was 
proper. 
5-5: Administrative 
The judge reasonably accommodates changing technology. 5-5: Administrative 
The judge paid attention to the proceedings in the courtroom. 5-5: Administrative 
The judge is collegial with other members of the court. 5-4: Professionalism 
When the judge explained to the jury the reasons for his or her decision, 
I understood. 
5-3: Communication 
Based on the judge’s explanations, I clearly understood my role and 
responsibility as a juror. 
5-3: Communication 
The jury instructions from the judge were clear and understandable. 5-3: Communication 
Based on the judge’s explanations, I understood the evidence I could or 
could not consider. 
5-3: Communication 
The judge demonstrated courtesy toward the attorneys, court staff, 
litigants, and others in the courtroom. 
5-4: Professionalism 
The judge made me feel that the court system is fair. 5-2: Integrity 
The judge took the case seriously. 5-4: Professionalism 
The judge treated the jury with respect. 5-4: Professionalism 
The judge provided recesses (breaks) in the trial that were adequate. 5-5: Administrative 
My experience with the judge helped me to understand the role of the 
jury in the legal system. 
5-4: Professionalism 
  
Survey Questions (2014) ABA Category 
The judge follows the applicable legal rules (e.g., civil procedure, 
criminal procedure, evidence, juvenile, appellate) that apply to the case. 
5-1: Legal Ability 
The judge makes appropriate findings of fact and applies the law to those 
facts. 
5-1: Legal Ability 
The judge follows legal precedent or clearly explains departures from 
precedent. 
5-1: Legal Ability 
The judge only considers evidence in the record. 5-1: Legal Ability 
The judge’s written opinions/decisions offer meaningful legal analysis. 5-1: Legal Ability 
The judge’s written opinions contain a fair statement of the pertinent 
facts. 
5-2: Integrity 
The judge’s written opinions contain a discussion of the applicable legal 
principles and controlling case law. 
5-1: Legal Ability 
The judge’s written opinions clearly address the merits of the legal issues 
advanced by the parties. 
5-3: Communication 
The judge’s written opinions provide clear guidance to trial court judges 
and practitioners. 
5-3: Communication 
The judge’s written opinions contain a readily understandable, concise 
ruling. 
5-3: Communication 
The judge’s written opinions reflect a neutral, professional tone. 5-2: Integrity 
The judge makes sure that everyone’s behavior in the courtroom is 
proper. 
5-5: Administrative 
The judge appears to pay attention to what goes on in court. 5-4: Professionalism 
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Survey Questions (2014) ABA Category 
The judge’s personal life or beliefs do not impair his or her judicial 
performance. 
5-2: Integrity 
The judge demonstrates respect for the time and expense of those 
attending court. 
5-4: Professionalism 
The judge promotes access to the justice system for people who speak a 
language other than English, or for people who have a physical or mental 
limitation. 
5-5: Administrative 
The judge is prepared for court proceedings. 5-5: Administrative 
The judge’s interactions with courtroom participants and staff are 
professional and constructive. 
5-4: Professionalism 
The judge is an effective manager. 5-5: Administrative 
The judge convenes court without undue delay. 5-5: Administrative 
The judge rules in a timely fashion. 5-5: Administrative 
The judge accommodates changing technology. 5-5: Administrative 
The judge maintains diligent work habits. 5-5: Administrative 
The judge’s oral communications are clear. 5-3: Communication 
The judge’s written opinions/decisions are clear and logical. 5-3: Communication 
The judge treats all courtroom participants with equal respect. 5-2: Integrity 
The judge is fair and impartial. 5-2: Integrity 
The judge promotes public trust and confidence in the courts through his 
or her conduct. 
5-4: Professionalism 
The judge provides the parties with a meaningful opportunity to be 
heard. 
5-4: Professionalism 
 
 
